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ABSTRACT
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participation and heterogeneous income risks. The introduction of non-redundant assets
endogenously modifies the participation set, reduces the covariance between dividends and
participants' consumption and thus leads to lower risk premia. In multisector economies, financial
innovation spreads across markets through the diversified portfolio of new entrants, and has rich
effects on the cross-section of expected returns. The price changes can also lead some investors to
leave the markets and give rise to non-degenerate forms of participation turnover. The model is
consistent with several features of financial markets over the past few decades: substantial
innovation; higher participation; significant turnover in investor composition; improved risk
management practices; a slight increase in interest rates; and a reduction in risk premia.
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The introduction of a vast array of non-redundant securities has transformed ﬁ-
nancial markets over the past few decades. Derivative contracts now allow ﬁrms
to routinely manage their exposure to commodity and ﬁnancial prices.1 New in-
surance and ﬁnancial products provide additional diversiﬁcation opportunities to
individual investors. Initial public oﬀerings have enabled entrepreneurs to diver-
sify some of their wealth away from the companies in which they had managerial
interests.2 Financial theory suggests that these innovations might have profound
implications for portfolio choice, asset pricing and the cross-sectional allocation
of risk.3 For instance, new instruments allow agents to reduce their exposure to
idiosyncratic or background shocks, which increases the demand for stocks and
leads to a lower market premium (e.g. Kihlstrom, Romer and Williams, 1981;
Nachman, 1982; Campbell and Viceira, 2002).
This paper shows that new mechanisms arise when participation is endogenized
in an economy with heterogeneous income risks.4 The introduction of new securi-
ties changes the participation set, decreases the covariance between dividends and
participants’ consumption, and thus ampliﬁe st h er e d u c t i o ni nt h em a r k e tp r e -
mium. In multifactor economies, ﬁnancial innovation also spreads across markets
through the diversiﬁed portfolio choices of new entrants and has rich eﬀects on the
cross-section of expected returns. The price changes can also lead some investors
to leave ﬁnancial markets. Innovation then induces the simultaneous entry and
exit of investors, giving rise to non-degenerate forms of participation turnover.5
Our approach builds on the existence of ﬁxed costs to participate in ﬁnancial
markets. Corporate hedging requires the employment of experts able to eﬀectively
reduce the ﬁrm’s risk exposure using existing ﬁnancial assets. Investors have to
sustain learning eﬀorts and expenses related to the opening and maintenance of
accounts with an exchange or a brokerage ﬁrm. Statutory and government reg-
1See for instance Ross (1976).
2Shiller (2003) provides a recent review of these developments.
3Theoretical investigations of ﬁnancial innovation include Allen and Gale (1994a, b), Calvet
(2001), Cass and Citanna (1998), Detemple and Selden (1991), Duﬃe and Jackson (1989),
Grossman (1989), Huang and Wang (1997), and Stein (1987). See Duﬃe and Rahi (1995) for a
review.
4While the discussion focuses on the eﬀect of an increase in spanning, the paper also analyzes
the consequences of a reduction in transactions costs.
5Hurst, Luoh and Staﬀord (1998) and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) report substantial rates of
entry and exit in US stockownership.
1ulations often create costly barriers to the participation of institutional investors
in some markets.
We introduce a two-period economy with incomplete markets and endogenous
participation. Agents can borrow or lend freely, but have to pay a ﬁxed entry
cost to invest in risky assets. They receive heterogeneous random incomes deter-
mined by a ﬁnite number of macroeconomic risk factors. Security prices and the
participation structure are jointly determined in equilibrium. The model is com-
putationally tractable and leads to a closed-form system of equilibrium equations
in the CARA-normal case. As mentioned earlier, three new mechanisms arise in
this economy.
First, the introduction of non-redundant instruments encourages more in-
vestors to participate in ﬁnancial markets for hedging and diversiﬁcation purposes.
Under plausible conditions on the cross-sectional distribution of risk, the new en-
trants reduce the covariance between stock returns and the mean consumption of
participants, leading to a lower market premium. The model thus illustrates the
connection between the cross-sectional distribution of risk and the price impact
of new assets. It is also consistent with features that have characterized ﬁnan-
cial markets in the past few decades: substantial ﬁnancial innovation, a sharp
increase in investor participation, improvements in risk-management practices, a
slight increase of real interest rates, and a reduction in the risk premium.6
Second, participation plays an important role in spreading the eﬀects of in-
novation across markets. When a common factor becomes tradable, some agents
decide to pay the entry fee and trade the new contract in order to manage their
risk exposure. The new participants achieve optimal diversiﬁcation by trading
other assets, which modiﬁes the risk premia even in sectors uncorrelated to the
new contract. Furthermore, the entrants tend to have a stronger impact on the
average exposure to the factor than on other sectors of the economy. As a result,
price changes are more pronounced for assets correlated with the new contract.
Financial innovation thus diﬀerentially aﬀects distinct sectors of the economy and
has a rich impact on the cross-section of expected returns.
Third, the price changes induced by ﬁnancial innovation can give rise to non-
degenerate forms of participation turnover. For instance, the introduction of a
new asset leads some agents to enter ﬁnancial markets to manage their income
6The decrease in the risk premium is reported in Blanchard (1993), Campbell and Shiller
(2003), Cochrane (1997) and Fama and French (2002). Similarly, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990)
and Honohan (2000) document a slight increase in real interest rates over the past three decades.
2risk. Other agents, however, are adversely aﬀected by the induced changes in risk
premia and may ﬁnd it optimal to stop trading. Innovation can therefore induce
simultaneous entry and exit. The paper thus helps relate participation turnover
with the cross-sectional distribution of risk in multisector economies.
Section 2 introduces a tractable asset pricing model with endogenous entry.
Section 3 demonstrates the pricing and participation eﬀects of ﬁnancial innovation
in a one-factor model of risk exposure. Multiple factors are considered in Section
4. Simple simulations suggest that ﬁnancial innovation substantially reduces the
equity premium, diﬀerentially spreads across security markets, and either increases
or decreases the interest rate. All proofs are given in the Appendix.
1.1. Review of Previous Literature
This paper builds on two strands of the asset pricing literature that have essen-
tially been developed separately. First, researchers have examined how limited
investor participation aﬀects the prices of a ﬁxed set of securities. Second, the
price impact of ﬁnancial innovation has been examined both empirically and the-
oretically without consideration of participation. The novelty of this paper is to
combine these two lines of research in a simple and tractable framework.
Empirical research on stockmarket participation was pioneered by Blume,
Crockett and Friend (1974), Blume and Friend (1978), and King and Leape (1984).
Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) report that only 28% of households owned stocks in
1984, and that 47% of households with liquid assets in excess of $100,000 held
any equity.7 The fraction of households owning stocks increases with income and
education, implying that there could be ﬁxed information costs to participate in
ﬁnancial markets. Stockholder consumption is also more highly correlated with
the market portfolio than aggregate consumption. The distinction between stock-
holders and non-stockholders therefore helps explain the equity premium puzzle.
The empirical validity of this mechanism is further conﬁrmed by Vissing-Jørgensen
(1997). Poterba and Samwick (1995) and Vissing-Jørgensen (1997) also document
the sharp increase of stock market participation in the United States since 1945.
These empirical ﬁndings have prompted the development of theoretical models
that restrict participation exogenously. Saito (1995) and Basak and Cuoco (1998)
thus consider two-asset exchange economies in which the risky security spans in-
dividual income. At low participation levels, a small number of agents bears in
7The structure of stockownership is further analyzed by Blume and Zeldes (1993) and Bertaut
and Haliassos (1995).
3equilibrium the aggregate risk of the entire population. As a result, the market
premium is high and matches the historical average under reasonable levels of risk
aversion. Heaton and Lucas (1999) extend the analysis by considering heteroge-
neous incomes with a common nonmarketable factor. In contrast to this earlier
work, we consider multiple assets and factors, and endogenize the participation
structure by considering ﬁxed costs to trading in ﬁnancial markets. The entry-cost
approach has been widely used in ﬁnance to analyze issues such as portfolio choice
(Campbell, Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout, 2001), volatility (Pagano, 1989; Allen
and Gale, 1994b; Orosel, 1998), futures risk premia (Hirshleifer, 1988), market
size (Allen and Gale, 1990; Pagano, 1993), and the eﬀect of social security reform
on capital accumulation (Abel, 2001). We use this setup to analyze how ﬁnancial
innovation aﬀects investor participation and asset prices.
The paper is also related to the literature that examines the price impact of
ﬁnancial innovation without consideration of participation. Conrad (1989) and
Detemple and Jorion (1990) ﬁnd empirically that the introduction of new batches
of options had a substantial price impact between 1973 and 1986. The eﬀect
is stronger for underlying stocks, but can also be observed for an industry index
that excludes the optioned stock as well as for the market index. Similar empirical
evidence is available for other countries and derivative markets (e.g. Jochum and
Kodres, 1998).
A rich theoretical literature has also explored the impact of innovation, and
three results are most directly related to our model. First, the introduction of
a new security permits agents to better share risk and thus weakens the pre-
cautionary supply of savings. This leads to a higher equilibrium interest rate,
which reduces the price of all assets in ﬁxed-participation exchange economies
(Weil, 1992; Elul, 1997).8 In contrast, we will show that price changes induced
by innovation can cause some investors to exit the market. Lower participation
then encourages precautionary savings and reduces the equilibrium interest rate
in some economies.
Second, ﬁnancial innovation does not aﬀect risk-pricing in standard mean-
variance settings with ﬁxed participation (Oh, 1996). Speciﬁcally in quadratic or
CARA-normal economies, the price of any risky security relative to the bond is
unaﬀected by changes in the span. For this reason, researchers have made little use
of mean-variance models to analyze the pricing implications of innovation.9 We
8See Angeletos and Calvet (2000) for the analysis of production economies.
9Detemple and Selden (1991) is a notable exception.
4will show that CARA-normal economies can be quite useful when the participation
structure is endogenized. New assets induce the entry of new investors, which
lowers the systematic consumption risk of participants and therefore increases the
price of preexisting securities.
Third, ﬁnancial innovation allows agents to reduce their exposure to idio-
syncratic or background shocks, which stimulates the demand for stocks (e.g.
Kihlstrom, Romer and Williams, 1981; Nachman, 1982; Gollier, 2001; Campbell
and Viceira, 2002). As a result, equilibrium risk premia tend to be lower after the
introduction of new assets. In our model, however, agents have CARA utilities and
reductions in background risk do not aﬀect the demand for risky assets. Changes
in the systematic consumption risk of participants are the only contributing fac-
tors to lower premia in our setup, which will greatly simplify the interpretation
of the results. We anticipate that our mechanism complements and ampliﬁes the
background risk channel when individual utilities are isoelastic or more generally
exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion.
2. A Model of Endogenous Market Participation
We examine an exchange economy with two periods (t =0 ,1) and a single per-
ishable good. The economy is deterministic at date t =0and stochastic at





, which corresponds for instance to a stochastic labor income. Her
preference over consumption streams (ch
0,e ch) is represented by a utility function
Uh(ch
0,e ch). We thus adopt the two-period setup that has widely been used in
the ﬁnancial innovation literature for its tractability (e.g. Allen and Gale 1994
a, b). We anticipate that our model provides useful insights on the properties of
multiperiod economies with permanent shocks.10
This paper places no restriction on the set of agents H,w h i c hc a nb eﬁnite or
inﬁnite. To provide a uniform treatment, we endow the space H with a measure
µ that satisﬁes µ(H)=1 . This is equivalent to viewing each element of H as a
type, and the measure µ as a probability distribution over all possible types.
At date t =0 , agents can exchange a ﬁnite number of real securities, whose
10A large body of research shows that transitory shocks can be easily self-insured while persis-
tent shocks have profound pricing and welfare implications in dynamic economies with incom-
plete markets (e.g. Bewley, 1977; Telmer, 1993; Constantinides and Duﬃe, 1996; Storesletten,
Telmer and Yaron, 1996; Levine and Zame, 2002). The extension of our framework to the
dynamic case, for instance following Calvet (2001), is a promising direction for future research.
5initial prices and ﬁnal payoﬀs are denominated in units of the consumption good.
The ﬁnancial structure is exogenous and contains two types of assets. First,
agents can trade a riskless asset costing π0 =1 /R in date t =0and delivering
o n eu n i to ft h eg o o dw i t hc e r t a i n t ya td a t et =1 .N o t e t h a t R is the gross
interest rate. Second, there also exist J risky assets (j =1 ,...J) with price πj
and random payoﬀ ˜ aj. We assume for simplicity that all assets are in zero net
supply.11 Investors can freely operate in the bond market but have to pay a ﬁxed
entry cost κ in order to invest in one or more risky assets. This assumption is
consistent with complementarities of learning in trading activities, and the results
of the paper easily generalize to more ﬂexible speciﬁcations of the entry cost.
Investors are price-takers both in their entry and portfolio decisions, and there
are no constraints on short sales. Let π denote the vector of risky asset prices,
and θ
h the vector of risky assets bought (or sold) by investor h.W ea l s oc o n s i d e r
the dummy variable 1{θh6=0} equal to 1 if θ
h 6=0 , and equal to 0 otherwise. The




0/R + π · θ
h + κ1{θh6=0} = eh
0,
˜ ch =˜ eh + θ
h
0 +˜ a · θ
h.
These equations are standard, except for the presence of the entry cost in the





calculating the consumption-portfolio decision under entry and non-entry. Com-




0dµ(h) and ˜ e =
R
H ˜ ehdµ(h) denote the average income of the
entire population.
Deﬁnition (Equilibrium). A general equilibrium with endogenous participation









(a) T h eg o o dm a r k e tc l e a r si ne v e r ys t a t e :
R
H(ch
0 + κ1{θh6=0})dµ(h)=e0, and
R
H ˜ ch (ω)dµ(h)=˜ e(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω;




jdµ(h)=0for all j ∈ {0,...,J}.
In the absence of entry fee (κ =0 ) , the deﬁnition coincides with the traditional
concept of general equilibrium under incomplete markets (GEI). When participa-
11A positive supply of assets could be considered by redeﬁning individual endowment as the
sum of a labor income and an exogenous portfolio of securities. This is a standard convention
in asset pricing theory, as discussed for instance in Magill and Quinzii (1996, ch. 3).
6tion is costly, a GEEP diﬀers from a GEI through two diﬀerent channels. First,
agents endogenously decide whether to pay the entry fee in order to trade risky
assets. Second, trading activities use some of society’s resources and crowd out
private consumption, as seen in the market clearing condition at date t =0 .T h i s
phenomenon, which we call the displacement eﬀect, probably plays a minor role in
actual economies. Extensions of our model could transfer a fraction of trading fees
to some consumers (such as exchange owners), or seek to provide a more detailed
description of the ﬁnancial industry.
The existence of equilibrium is proven in Appendix A. As in the GEI case,
equilibrium allocations are usually Pareto ineﬃcient because missing markets in-
duce incomplete risk-sharing. With two periods and a single good, however, GEI
allocations are known to satisfy a limited or constrained form of eﬃciency. No
social planner can improve the utility of all agents when income transfers are
constrained to belong to the asset span. This limited form of eﬃciency easily
generalizes to our setting when the planner pays the entry fee required to use the
risky asset.
Deﬁnitions (Constrained Eﬃciency). An allocation (ch
0,˜ ch)h∈H is feasible if:
(a) For all h, there exists (θ
h
0,θ
h) ∈ R × RJ such that ˜ ch =˜ eh + θ
h





0 + κ1{θh6=0})dµ(h)=e0, and
R
H ˜ ch (ω)dµ(h)=˜ e(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω.
A feasible allocation is called constrained Pareto-eﬃcient if no other feasible allo-
cation makes all agents strictly better oﬀ.
Appendix A shows that a GEEP allocation is constrained Pareto-eﬃcient. As a
result, the introduction of a non redundant asset cannot make all agents worse
oﬀ.
In order to analyze the eﬀect of ﬁnancial innovation on participation and prices,
we now specialize to a tractable class of CARA-normal economies. Investors have





where γ and χ are positive coeﬃcients. The agent maximizes −e−χc0 − βe−χc1
when she reallocates through time a deterministic income ﬂow. On the other
hand, atemporal risky choices only depend on Ee−γe c. When future consumption
is normally distributed, we can rewrite the utility as −e−χc0 − βe−χ[Ee c−γVar(e c)/2].
The speciﬁcation reduces to standard expected utility when χ = γ.
7Individual endowments and the payoﬀs of risky assets are jointly normal. The
securities generate a linear subspace in the set L2(Ω) of square-integrable random
variables. We assume without loss of generality that risky assets are centered and
mutually independent: (˜ a1,..,˜ aJ) ∼ N (0,I).L e tA denote the span of the risky
assets, and A⊥ the subspace orthogonal to all securities (including the bond).
Projections play an important role in the discussion, and ˜ xV conveniently denotes
the projection of a random variable ˜ x on a subspace V .
2.1. Individual Entry Decision
We solve the decision problem of a given trader h by calculating the consump-
tion - portfolio choice under entry and non-entry. Consider the security ˜ mA ≡
−(R/γ)
PJ
j=1 πj˜ aj, which is determined by risk aversion and market prices. We
can easily show:










0 − E˜ e













units of the bond, and θ
h,p
j = −Cov(˜ aj, ˜ eh) − Rπj/γ units of risky asset j.C o n -
sumption is
e c







in the second period.
We infer from (2.1) that the investor exchanges the marketable component ˜ ehA of
her income risk for the tradable portfolio ˜ mA, which provides the optimal mix of
risk and return. Because markets are incomplete, she is also constrained to bear
the undiversiﬁable income risk ˜ ehA⊥.
Investment in the riskless asset is the sum of two components, which corre-
spond to intertemporal smoothing and the precautionary motive. First, the agent
uses the riskless asset to reallocate her expected income stream between the two
periods. Note that she compensates for any discrepancy between her subjec-
tive discount factor and the interest rate. Second, she saves more when future
prospects are more uncertain. As will be seen in the next section, ﬁnancial in-
novation aﬀects the precautionary component by modifying the portfolio ˜ mA and
by reducing the undiversiﬁable income risk ˜ ehA⊥.
8The consumption of the non-participating investor is obtained from Proposi-





















in the ﬁrst period, and consumes ˜ ch,n =˜ eh+θ
h,n
0 in the second. She thus bears the
entire endowment risk in her ﬁnal consumption, and her precautionary demand
for the bond depends on the whole variance of future income.
The investor makes her participation decision by comparing utility under en-
try and non-entry. In the CARA-normal case, this reduces to maximizing the
certainty equivalent Ee ch − γVar(e ch)/2. We can easily check that the beneﬁto f
trading risky assets is γVar
¡
˜ ehA − ˜ mA¢
/2, while the opportunity cost is κR.T h i s
leads to






hA − ˜ m
A¢
>κ R , (2.3)
and is indiﬀerent between entry and non-entry if the relation holds as an equality.
Relation (2.3) has a simple geometric interpretation in L2(Ω), which is illustrated
in Figure 1. The agent trades risky assets if the distance between her income risk
˜ ehA and her optimal portfolio ˜ mA is larger than
p
2κR/γ. The trader pays the
entry fee only if her initial position is suﬃciently diﬀerent from the optimum, as
is standard in decision problems with adjustment costs.
The theorem has a natural interpretation when all agents have a positive ex-
posure to certain classes of risks. Participants with low exposure to marketable
shocks buy the corresponding assets to earn a risk premium; these agents are
called speculators or investors.12 On the other hand, agents with high exposure
hedge by shorting the corresponding risky assets; these agents are hedgers or is-
suers. The model thus closely matches the type of risk-sharing examined in the
futures literature.
12Massa and Simonov (2002) document empirically the substantial impact of labor income
risk on individual participation. In particular, households are less likely to invest in ﬁnancial
markets when their income has a higher correlation with a diversiﬁed stock portfolio. These
ﬁndings are consistent with entry condition (2.3) since the participation beneﬁtc a nb er e w r i t t e n
as γ[−2Cov(˜ mA;˜ eh)+Va r(˜ ehA)+Va r(˜ mA)]/2.
92.2. Equilibrium
Let P ⊆ H denote the set of participants in the risky asset markets. When the
class of indiﬀerent agents has measure zero, we can write
P =
©
h ∈ H : γVar(˜ e




Market participants can have diﬀerent income risk characteristics than the entire
population. We will show in Sections 3 and 4 that this diﬀerence is a driving
element of the model.13 While ˜ e denotes the mean income in the population, we
deﬁne the average endowment of participants as ˜ ep =
R
P ˜ ehdµp(h), where µp is the
conditional measure µ/µ(P).14
In equilibrium, the common consumption risk ˜ mA coincides with the average





Theorem 2 (Asset Prices). In equilibrium, an asset ˜ a is worth
π(˜ a)=[ E˜ a − γCov(˜ e
p,˜ a)]/R. (2.6)
The interest rate satisﬁes






















The participation set and asset prices are jointly determined by (2.4) − (2.7).
An asset is valuable if it provides a hedge against the consumption risk of par-
ticipants. Since entry is endogenous, ﬁnancial innovation can change the market
endowment ˜ ep, and therefore the price π(˜ a)/R−1 = E˜ a − γCov(˜ ep,˜ a) of a risky
asset relative to the bond. As noted by Oh (1996), such a channel does not exist
in a CARA-normal economy with a ﬁxed set of traders: an increase in the span
then has no eﬀect on Cov(˜ ep,˜ a) and thus on the price of a risky asset relative to
13Heaton and Lucas (2000) show the empirical validity of this distinction.
14More speciﬁcally, the conditional measure µp is µ/µ(P) if µ(P) > 0, and identically zero
otherwise.
10t h eb o n d . T h ep o s s i b l ee ﬀect of ﬁnancial innovation on the risk premium thus
crucially relies on the endogeneity of participation in our model.
The equilibrium interest rate R is inﬂuenced by two economic eﬀects corre-
sponding to the last two terms of (2.7). First, the interest rate tends to be higher
when more ﬁrst period resources κµ(P) are absorbed in the entry process. The
second term of (2.7) corresponds to the precautionary motive. The variance of
individual consumption is Va r(˜ epA)+Va r(˜ ehA⊥) if an agent participates, and























This term is large when many agents participate or many hedging instruments are
available. The ﬁnancial markets then permit agents to greatly reduce their risk
exposure, which dampens their precautionary motive, reduces the demand for the
riskless asset, and leads to an increase in the equilibrium interest rate.15
The entry condition (2.3) suggests that a lower fee or improved spanning tends
to encourage entry. For instance when the cost κ is inﬁnite, no agent trades risky
assets and the equilibrium interest rate equals R0. The equilibrium set of par-
ticipants, however, may not increase monotonically with the ﬁnancial structure.
This is because the entry condition (2.3) depends on the endogenous variables
˜ ep and R. When new assets are added, a participating agent h may leave the
market because the diversiﬁcation beneﬁt γVar(˜ ehA − e epA)/2 has dropped or the
opportunity cost has increased. Sections 3 and 4 will provide examples of such
behaviors.
The eﬀect of ﬁnancial innovation on the interest rate is easily predicted when
the average endowment of participants remains constant.
Proposition 2. Financial innovation leads to a higher interest rate when the
mean endowment ˜ ep is unchanged.
The proof has a straightforward intuition. A lower interest rate would reinforce the
favorable eﬀect of ﬁnancial innovation on entry and lead, by (2.7), to a higher in-
terest rate - a contradiction. Thus if the participants’ average endowment does not
vary, existing asset prices necessarily decrease with ﬁnancial innovation. Changes
15This equation is thus consistent with the well-known eﬀect that ﬁnancial innovation increases
the interest rate when the participation structure is exogenous (Weil, 1992; Elul, 1997).
11in ˜ ep thus play a crucial role in determining the impact of ﬁnancial innovation on
asset prices. To better understand this role, we now introduce a factor model of
risk exposure.
3. Economies with a Unique Risk Factor
We consider in this section an economy with a unique factor ˜ ε that linearly aﬀects
all incomes. The endowment of each investor h is speciﬁed as
˜ e
h = E˜ e
h + ϕ
h˜ ε, (3.1)
where ϕh is the individual risk loading. The model is tractable when the shock
and the assets are jointly normal. Without loss of generality, we assume that ˜ ε has
a standard distribution N(0,1) and generates a non-negative average loading ¯ ϕ in
the population.16 The cross-sectional distribution of ϕ is speciﬁed by a measure
µ on the real line. To clarify the exposition, we assume that the measure µ has a
continuous density f(ϕ), whose support is the nonnegative interval [0,∞).17
When ﬁnancial markets are incomplete, existing securities span only partially
the common shock. The projection of ˜ ε on the asset span, ˜ εA =
PJ
i=1 Cov(˜ εA,e aj)e aj,
is the tradable component of the factor. The corresponding variance
α = Va r(˜ ε
A)
quantiﬁes the insurable fraction of the risk ˜ ε and thus represents a useful index of
market completeness.S i n c e˜ ε has unit variance, the index α is contained between 0
and 1. The values α =0and α =1respectively correspond to the absence of risky
assets (A = {0}) and the full marketability of the shock (˜ ε ∈ A).I n t e r m e d i a t e
values of α arise when agents can only trade the bond and a risky asset imperfectly
correlated with the aggregate shock.
The portfolio ˜ εA and the index α have direct empirical interpretations. We
obtain ˜ εA by regressing the factor ˜ ε on the asset payoﬀs. The determination coef-
ﬁcient R2 then provides an estimate of the completeness index α. This approach
is easily implemented when the factor represents GDP or an aggregate shock that
is not directly tradable on organized exchanges (Roll, 1977). The introduction of
a non-redundant asset increases the index α and helps market participants hedge
16Purely idiosyncratic shocks are ruled out in this section for expositional simplicity.
17The theorems of this section are in fact proved for densities f(ϕ) with arbitrary unbounded
supports.
12more closely the risk ˜ ε. Since macroeconomic variables such as GDP are often
observed with measurement errors and lags, improvements in national accounting
can also lead to more precise hedging and thus a higher α.
3.1. Participation Structure
We infer from Section 2 the equilibrium of the one-factor economy. Let ϕp denote







The participation set contains agents whose loading ϕ is suﬃciently diﬀerent from
ϕp :
P = {ϕ ∈ R : |ϕ − ϕ
p| ≥ Λ}, (3.3)
where Λ =
p
2κR/(αγ).18 We note that Λ is the half-width of the non-participation
region, and henceforth call it the non-participation parameter. Λ increases with
the entry cost κ and the interest rate R, and decreases with the completeness index
α and the risk aversion γ.T h u sﬁnancial innovation, either in the form of a lower
entry fee or an increase in spanning, tends to decrease Λ. The participation set is
illustrated in Figure 2. Agents ϕ ≥ ϕp + Λ are hedgers who trade assets in order
to reduce their risk exposure. Conversely, agents with loadings ϕ ≤ ϕp − Λ are
speculators who increase their consumption risk in order to earn a higher return.
The equilibrium calculation is simpliﬁed by the following observation: ϕp is
both the average loading and the midpoint of the participation set.19 As shown
in Appendix B, these restrictions impose that a unique midpoint ϕp is consistent
with a given half-width Λ:
Property 1 (Participation Set). For any non-participation parameter Λ ≥ 0,
there exists a unique loading ϕp(Λ) satisfying conditions (3.2) and (3.3).T h e
corresponding participation sets PΛ =( −∞;ϕp(Λ) − Λ] ∪ [ϕp(Λ)+Λ;+∞) are
nested and decreasing in Λ: PΛ0 ⊆ PΛ for all Λ ≤ Λ0.
18Agent h trades risky assets if the participation beneﬁt is larger than the opportunity cost:
αγ(ϕh −ϕp)2/2 ≥ κR, or equivalently |ϕh −ϕp| ≥ Λ. When assets have no correlation with the
risk factor (α =0 ) , the participation set is empty under costly entry (κ>0) and indeterminate
under free entry (κ =0 ) .






(ϕ−ϕp)f(ϕ)dϕ =0 , which implicitly
deﬁnes ϕp as a function of Λ.
13When the midpoint ϕp is exogenously ﬁxed, it is clear that the sets (−∞;ϕp −
Λ] ∪ [ϕp + Λ;+∞) are decreasing with the non-participation parameter Λ.W e
show in the Appendix that the property also holds when the midpoint ϕp(Λ)
varies endogenously. Furthermore since the sets PΛ are nested, the half-width Λ
provides a precise ordering of the participation structure. A high Λ corresponds
to a small set PΛ and thus a low participation rate µ(PΛ).
The midpoint ϕp controls the pricing of risk. Entrants have average income
˜ ep = E˜ ep + ϕp(˜ εA +˜ εA⊥
) and individual random consumption
e c






We note that the marketable consumption risk ϕp˜ εA is identical for all partici-
pants. In equilibrium, the average loading ϕp determines the covariance between
am a r k e t e ds e c u r i t ye a and individual consumption: Cov(e ch,e a)=ϕpCov(˜ ε,e a),a n d
therefore the risk premium.
Financial innovation, either in the form of new assets or lower entry costs,
aﬀects ϕp through changes in Λ. T h ei m p a c to fi n n o v a t i o no nt h ea v e r a g el o a d i n g
ϕp and the risk premium therefore depends on the cross-sectional distribution of
r i s k ,a si sn o ws h o w n .
Property 2 (Monotonicity of Average Loading). When the loading density
veriﬁes the skewness condition
f(ϕ
p − Λ) >f(ϕ
p + Λ), (3.4)
the average loading ϕp locally increases with the non-participation parameter Λ.
Figure 2 illustrates the mechanism underlying this key result. When Λ decreases,
t h es k e w n e s so ft h el o a d i n gd e n s i t yi m p l i e st h a tm o r ea g e n t se n t e rt ot h el e f t
(speculators) than to the right (hedgers) of ϕp, which pushes down the average
consumption loading ϕp.
To develop intuition, we now analyze the eﬀect of ﬁnancial innovation on the
risk premium in an economy in which the interest rate is exogenously ﬁxed. The
entry condition Λ =
p
2κR/(αγ) expresses the non-participation parameter as a
function of purely exogenous quantities. A higher completeness index α (or a lower
transaction cost κ) reduces the half-width Λ and thus increases the participation
set PΛ. The implied movement in ϕp controls changes in risk pricing. Consider an
asset e a that has positive correlation with the factor, and let e Ra = e a/π(e a) denote
14the random (gross) return. By Theorem 2, the r e l a t i v er i s kp r e m i u msatisﬁes




Ee a − γϕpCov(e a,˜ ε)
.
The higher α (or lower κ) due to ﬁnancial innovation reduces the participation
parameter Λ and induces the entry of new agents. Under skewness condition
(3.4), a majority of the new entrants has a low exposure and reduces the covariance
between the participants’ average loading and the asset. Financial innovation thus
simultaneously induces higher participation and a reduction in the risk premium.
These results illustrate the role of the loading density f(ϕ) for the comparative
statics of asset prices.
3.2. General Equilibrium
We now extend the analysis to the case of an endogenous interest rate. The entry
condition can be rewritten
R1(Λ)=αγΛ
2/(2κ). (3.5)
The equilibrium of the bond market implies
R2(Λ)=R0 exp{χµ(PΛ)[κ + αγ(Va r PΛϕ)/2]}, (3.6)
where Va r PΛ(ϕ)=
R
PΛ(ϕ − ϕp)2dµp(ϕ) denotes the variance of the participants’
loadings. In Figure 3, we graph these functions in the (Λ,R) plane. An equilibrium
corresponds to the intersection of these two curves. The quadratic function R1(Λ)
is increasing, while R2(Λ) monotonically decreases with Λ. This helps establish
Theorem 3 (Existence and Uniqueness). There exists a unique equilibrium.
F i g u r e3a l l o w su st oa n a l y z et h ei m p a c to fﬁnancial innovation. An increase in
α pushes up both curves in the ﬁgure, implying a higher interest rate and an
ambiguous change in the non-participation parameter Λ.
Proposition 3 (Impact of Financial Innovation). The riskless rate R in-
creases with ﬁnancial innovation. As the completeness index α increases from 0
to 1, the set of participants P has two possible behaviors. It is either monoton-
ically increasing; or there exists α∗ ∈ (0,1) such that P increases on [0,α ∗] and
decreases on [α∗,1].
15The two behaviors are illustrated in Figure 4. The ambiguous eﬀect of ﬁnancial
innovation on market participation has a simple intuition. On one hand, a higher
α increases the diversiﬁcation beneﬁt αγ(ϕh − ϕp)2/2 of trading risky assets and
encourages entry. On the other hand, new assets reduce the precautionary motive
and increase the interest rate, thus discouraging participation. In empirical set-
tings, we expect that the favorable eﬀect of improved diversiﬁcation, which stems
from risk aversion, will tend to dominate the adverse eﬀect of the precautionary
motive.20
The one-factor model may help explain a number of features that have char-
acterized ﬁnancial markets in the past three decades. New ﬁnancial instruments
encouraged investors to participate in ﬁnancial markets, which led to a reduction
in the precautionary motive and in the covariance between stockholder consump-
tion and the aggregate shock. These two eﬀects in turn increased the interest rate
and reduced the risk premium.21 Note that this argument is consistent with earlier
empirical ﬁndings. Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) thus show that the consumption of
stockholders tends to be more correlated with the market than the consumption of
non-stockholders. As ﬁnancial innovation leads more people to enter the market,
the risk premium falls. We leave the empirical exploration of this mechanism to
further research.
In this section, ﬁnancial innovation consists of providing a better hedge against
a common risk factor. In practice, however, households and ﬁr m sf a c em u l t i p l e
sources of income shocks, and innovation often permits to hedge classes of risk that
had been previously uninsurable. For this reason, we next examine a multifactor
model of risk.
20The global monotonicity results of Proposition 3 are proven in Appendix B using a single
crossing argument. Additional insights can be gained by examining the local sensitivity of R1 and
R1 to the completeness index α. Let ηX,α = dlnX/dlnα denote the elasticity of an endogenous
quantity X. We infer from (3.5) that ηΛ,α =( ηR,α − 1)/2. Financial innovation increases the
set of participants (ηΛ,α < 0) if it has a weak impact on the interest rate (ηR,α < 1). Condition
(3.5) also implies that the elasticity of R2(Λ) with respect to α increases with the dispersion of
the participants’ loadings Va r PΛϕ. When traders have very heterogeneous incomes, ﬁnancial
innovation allows agents to greatly reduce their average consumption risk, and thus has a strong
impact on the interest rate. This explains why participation is non-monotonic in Figure 4 for
the loading density with the highest variance.
21As shown in Appendix B, a higher entry cost implies a higher risk premium under condition
(3.4). Like models with exogenously restricted participation (e.g. Basak and Cuoco, 1998), our
framework thus helps explain the equity premium puzzle.
164. Multifactor Economies
We now investigate an economy with a ﬁnite number of risk factors (˜ ε1,..,˜ εL),
which correspond to macroeconomic or sectoral shocks aﬀecting individual income.
For instance, ˜ ε1 could be an aggregate risk, and ˜ ε2,..,˜ εL industry or sector-speciﬁc
s h o c k s .W es p e c i f yt h ei n c o m eo fe a c hi n v e s t o rh as
˜ e






 ˜ ε , (4.1)
and denote by ϕh =( ϕh
1,...,ϕh
L) the vector of individual loadings. The model is
tractable when the risk factors and the asset payoﬀs are jointly normal. Without
loss of generality, we normalize the factors to have unit variances and no mu-
tual correlation: (˜ ε1,..,˜ εL) ∼ N (0,I). The distribution of factor loadings in the
population is speciﬁed by a continuous density f (ϕ) on RL.
The factors may not be fully tradable when ﬁnancial markets are incom-
plete. As in the previous section, it is useful to consider their projections ˜ εA
  = PJ
j=1 Cov(˜ ε ,˜ aj)˜ aj on the asset span. We interpret ˜ εA
  as the marketable com-
ponent of factor  , which can be estimated by regressing ˜ ε  on asset payoﬀs. We
conveniently stack the projected factors in a vector ˜ εA =( ˜ εA
1 ,..,˜ εA
L). The covari-
ance matrix ΣA = Va r
¡
˜ εA¢
is a generalized index of market completeness, whose





quantify the insurable fraction of each factor.
We assume for simplicity that the projected factors are mutually uncorrelated:
Cov(˜ εA
  ,˜ εA
k)=0for all distinct   and k. In the next subsections, this hypothesis
will make it more striking that the improved marketability of factor   aﬀects the
r i s kp r e m i u mo na nu n c o r r e l a t e dc o m p o n e n t˜ εA


















contained between 0 and 1. We note that ΣA is
equal to zero when there are no assets, and to the identity matrix when markets
are complete.
The equilibrium calculation follows directly from Section 2. By (4.1), the mean




 ˜ ε , where ϕ
p
  represents
the traders’ average exposure to factor  . The equilibrium of ﬁnancial markets
17implies the relations π(˜ a)=[ E˜ a − γCov(˜ ep,˜ a)]/R and










where lnR0 =l n ( 1 /β)+χ(Ee e−e0)−(γχ/2)
PL
i=1 E(ϕ2
i). These equations suggest
that when the utility coeﬃcients γ and χ−1 are large, ﬁnancial innovation generates
both substantial variations in the pricing of risk and small movements in the
interest rate.
By entry condition (2.3), the participation set depends on the completeness














When all the coeﬃcients α  are strictly positive, the participants are located out-




L).22 The half-widths Λ  =
p
2κR/(α γ)
of the ellipsoid along each axis depend on the completeness index α  and the en-
dogenous interest rate. We show in Appendix C:
Theorem 4 (Existence and Uniqueness). There exists a unique equilibrium.
The proof begins by establishing that the vector Λ =( Λ1,..,ΛL) deﬁne a unique
participation set PΛ. In contrast to the one-factor case, however, PΛ can move
in more than one direction and thus need not be decreasing (as a set) in each
component Λ . The market clearing of the bond uniquely determines the inter-
est rate R and the half-widths Λ  =
p
2κR/(α γ). The proof also provides a
useful algorithm for the numerical computation of equilibrium. We now examine
the comparative statics of participation and asset prices with respect to ﬁnancial
innovation.
4.1. Financial Innovation and the Risk Premium
The one-factor model shows that ﬁnancial innovation can reduce the risk premium
of securities correlated with the aggregate shock. In a multifactor economy, the
improved marketability of a factor can also have pricing eﬀects on uncorrelated
assets. Consider for instance an economy with two factors: e ε1 is an aggregate
22The participants are located outside a cylinder when some coeﬃcients α  are equal to zero.
18risk to which all investors are positively exposed, and e ε2 is purely idiosyncratic
or distributional. Let ˜ a = Ee a +˜ εA
1 ,π (˜ a) > 0, denote an asset or stock that is
only correlated with the aggregate risk.23 By equation (2.6), the stock has relative
premium










When participation is exogenously ﬁxed, the consumption loading ϕ
p
1 is constant
and the improved marketability of the idiosyncratic shock ˜ ε2 does not aﬀect the
premium (4.4). In our model, however, innovation can aﬀect the set of partici-
pants, the consumption loading ϕ
p
1 and therefore the equity premium.
To further illustrate this mechanism, assume that the stock ˜ a is the only asset
initially traded (α2 =0 ) . By (4.3), non-participants have loadings ϕ1 that are close




2κR/(α1γ). When the index α2 increases,
some agents become willing to pay the entry cost because their exposure ϕ2 to
the idiosyncratic risk is suﬃciently diﬀerent from the average ϕ
p
2. These new
participants also trade the stock ˜ a to achieve optimal diversiﬁcation. The risk
premium on ˜ a declines if a majority of the new entrants have low exposure to the
aggregate shock (ϕ1 <ϕ
p
1) and increase the demand for the stock. We expect this
logic to hold when the distribution of ϕ1 is skewed towards the origin, consistent
with the intuition developed in the one-factor case.
A simple simulation of the cross-sectoral eﬀect is presented in Figure 5. We
assume for simplicity that exposures to the aggregate and idiosyncratic risks
are independent in the population. The cross-sectional loading density is then
f(ϕ1,ϕ 2)=f1(ϕ1)f2(ϕ2). This hypothesis makes it perhaps more surprising that
increased marketability of the idiosyncratic risk modiﬁes the equity premium. We
specify f2(ϕ2) to be symmetric around zero, which implies that ϕ
p
2 =0in equi-
librium. We discuss the choice of parameters in Appendix C. The average payoﬀ
of the stock is selected to obtain a risk premium Ee Ra −R equal to 7% before the
introduction of new contracts (α2 =0 ) . In the absence of a futures market, the
n e ti n t e r e s tr a t ee q u a l s1% and the standard deviation of the stock [Va r(e Ra)]1/2
is 15%, implying an initial Sharpe ratio of about 1/2.
In Figures 5A-5D, the solid lines illustrates equilibrium in the endogenous par-
ticipation economy as α2 increases from 0 to 1. The dashed lines illustrate the
23While the assets are assumed to be in zero net supply, we easily reinterpret the model
in terms of equity by viewing endowment as the sum of a labor income and an exogenous
endowment of stocks.
19corresponding outcomes when participation is exogenously ﬁxed. For comparison
purposes, the participation sets in both economies coincide when α2 =0 . Under
ﬁxed participation, innovation only has a very modest impact on the equity pre-
mium, the interest rate and volatility.24 In contrast, substantial movements are
observed when entry is endogenous. The risk premium on the stock declines from
7% to 4.5%. Providing insurance against the idiosyncratic shock thus substan-
tially decreases the risk premium through changes in participation. Consistent
with empirical evidence, the standard deviation of the stock return is almost con-
s t a n ta t1 5 % .25 We observe that most of the decline in the risk premium occurs
when the hedging coeﬃcient α2 increases from 0 to 0.5. The value α2 =0 .5 also
yields values for participation (60%) and the real net interest rate (2.5%)t h a t
are reasonable for the current US economy. This suggests that the cross-sectoral
eﬀects induced by ﬁnancial innovation may be quantitatively signiﬁcant.26 We
leave to further research the full empirical assessment of this mechanism.
4.2. Diﬀerential Eﬀects, Participation Turnover and Interest Rate
We now explore three additional consequences of innovation in the multifactor
model: diﬀerential changes in sectoral risk premia, simultaneous entry and exit,
and a possible reduction of the interest rate.
The previous simulations assumed that the loading density f2(ϕ2) is symmetric
around zero. Participants insure the marketable component of the idiosyncratic
shock at no cost, and an asset correlated only with e ε2 yields no risk premium
(ϕ
p
2 =0 ) . We now examine an economy in which the loading density f2(ϕ2)
24We know from equation (4.4) that ﬁnancial innovation has no impact on the relative risk
premium (ERa − R)/R. Figure 5 shows that the interest rate R and thus the risk premium
ERa −R are also approximately constant in the calibrated economy when the idiosyncratic risk
becomes tradable.
25Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel and Xu (2001) document that the volatility of stock market
indices have been stationary over the past century.
26An increase in α2 reduces the idiosyncratic or background risk of all participants. When
utilities are isoelastic (or more generally exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion), the reduction
in background risk increases the demand for the stock and thus further reduces the risk premium.
We anticipate that this additional channel substantially ampliﬁes the pricing eﬀect of ﬁnancial
innovation in more general setups. A similar argument is made by Heaton and Lucas (1999,
pp. 237-239). Their framework, however, only considers a unique risk factor and asset, and
therefore does not permit the distinction between background risk and aggregate shock. We
anticipate that their numerical results would be strengthened by the simultaneous reduction of
trader exposure to the aggregate and idiosyncratic risks considered in this paper.
20has a positive support and is skewed towards the origin. The risks e ε1 and e ε2
are independent sources of aggregate uncertainty that yield positive and possibly
distinct premia. Financial innovation can diﬀerentially aﬀect asset prices across
sectors, and thus have rich eﬀects on the cross-section of expected returns.
The comparative statics analysis of Figure 2 easily extends to the two-factor
case. We consider a ﬁnancial structure with completeness indices α1 and α2, and
assume for simplicity that interest rate R is exogenous. The ellipse delimiting the
participation set is illustrated by a solid line in Figure 6A.I ti sc e n t e r e da tϕp and
has half-width Λ  =
p
2κR/(α γ) along each axis. Consider an increase in the
second index from α2 to α0
2. Since the interest is ﬁxed, the limiting boundary in
the new equilibrium has the same horizontal Λ1 but a shorter vertical half-width
Λ0
2. We represent the intermediate ellipse centered at ϕp with parameters Λ1
and Λ0





2, and thus tend to push the new equilibrium set towards the origin.
Because these agents are more spread out vertically than horizontally, the induced
movement in ϕp tends to be stronger along the vertical axis, i.e. in the direction of
innovation. The increased marketability of the shock e ε2 may thus predominantly
inﬂuence the risk premium in the second sector.
The new set of participants is delimited by the ellipse centered at ϕp
new with
half-widths Λ1 and Λ0
2, a si l l u s t r a t e di nF i g u r e6B. Financial innovation induces
simultaneous entry and exit. Agents in the shaded area are initially out of the
market. When the new asset is introduced, these agents face lower hedging costs
and decide to participate. Agents in the dashed area, on the other hand, are
initially investing in ﬁnancial assets. Lower risk premia reduce the proﬁtability of
their investments and result in their leaving the market. The possibility of simul-
taneous entry and exit is thus an attractive feature of the multifactor model.27 In
future work, this property may prove useful to relate the cross-sectional distrib-
u t i o no fr i s kw i t hp a t t e r n so fe n t r ya n de x i ti nU Ss t o c k o w n e r s h i p( e . g . H u r s t ,
Luoh and Staﬀord, 1998; Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002).
The diﬀerential eﬀect is illustrated in Figure 7 on a numerical example. The
marginal densities of the factor loadings are identical log-normals. The initial
economy has hedging coeﬃcients α1 = α2 = α. We assume that the interest
rate is endogenous and consider two ﬁxed assets e a  = x  + e ε
A
  (  =1 ,2) with
ar i s kp r e m i u mo f7%. The symmetry of the economy imposes that x1 = x2.
27Participation tunover also arises when the distribution of ϕ2 is symmetric, as shown in the
p r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .
21As α2 increases from α to 1, both risk premia fall and the eﬀect is stronger for
the second asset. The results of the ﬁg u r ea r ea l m o s tu n c h a n g e dw h e nt h en e t
interest rate is exogenously set at 2%.T h e d i ﬀerential eﬀect is an important
feature of the multifactor economy. It distinguishes the introduction of sector-
speciﬁc securities from changes aﬀecting all security markets, such as a reduction
in taxes or transaction costs.
Multifactor economies also imply novel results for the comparative statics of
the interest rate. As discussed in Section 2, the introduction of new assets increases
risk-sharing opportunities and weakens the precautionary demand for savings. In
models with exogenous participation, this leads to a higher equilibrium interest
rate under many speciﬁcations, including CARA-normal (Weil, 1992; Elul, 1997).
In contrast, the Appendix establishes that when participation is endogenous,
Proposition 4. The interest rate locally decreases with ﬁnancial innovation in
some multifactor economies.
This result has a simple geometric intuition. When new assets are introduced, the
movement of ϕp pushes the ellipse towards a region containing a large number of
participants. In some economies, this eﬀect is suﬃciently strong to reduce overall
participation and the interest rate.
5. Conclusion
This paper develops a tractable asset pricing model with incomplete markets and
endogenous participation. Agents receive heterogeneous random incomes deter-
mined by a ﬁnite number of risk factors. They can borrow or lend freely, but must
pay a ﬁxed entry cost to invest in risky assets. Security prices and the participa-
tion set are jointly determined in equilibrium. The introduction of non-redundant
assets encourages investors to participate in ﬁnancial markets for hedging and
diversiﬁcation purposes. Under plausible conditions on the cross-sectional distrib-
ution of risk, the new entrants reduce the covariance between dividends and trader
consumption, which induces a reduction in the risk premium.
This logic is easily demonstrated in a simple one-factor model. Financial
innovation also has cross-sectoral eﬀects in economies with multiple sources of risk.
When a factor becomes tradable, new agents are drawn to the market in order
to manage their risk exposure. Under complementarities in learning or increasing
returns to trading activities, the new agents also become active in preexisting
22markets and can modify the risk premia of securities uncorrelated to the factor.
This mechanism diﬀerentially aﬀects distinct sectors of the economy and thus may
have a rich impact on the cross-section of expected returns. Simultaneous entry
and exit is another attractive feature of the multifactor model, which could be
useful for the analysis of participation turnover in economies with heterogeneous
income risks.
This paper suggests several directions for empirical research. Future work
could assess the contribution of ﬁnancial innovation to the decline of the equity
premium in the past few decades. Participation changes may also help explain
the pricing eﬀects of new derivatives reported in the empirical literature. From
a policy perspective, the mechanisms examined in this paper provide useful in-
sights on current debates in public and international economics. When countries
face ﬁxed costs to ﬁnancial integration, the model implies that the creation of
new markets can have profound pricing, participation and welfare consequences.
An extension of this work could investigate the political economy of the macro
markets advocated by Shiller and others. Further research may also evaluate gov-
ernment policies aﬀecting asset creation and participation costs, such as ﬁnancial
regulation, taxes, and social security reform.
236. Appendix A - Existence and Constrained Eﬃciency
6.1. Existence
We prove existence for a convex economy with a ﬁnite state space Ω = {1,..,S}.
and non-negative consumption sets. The utility Uh of every agent is continuous,
strongly monotonic and strictly quasi-concave on R
S+1
+ . At prices where agents
are indiﬀerent between entry (θ
h 6=0 )and non-entry (θ
h =0 ) , individual demand
consists of two distinct points. We avoid discontinuities in aggregate demand by
assuming that there is a ﬁnite number of types h =1 ,..,H,a n dac o n t i n u u mo f
agents in each type.
Given q =( p0,π0,π), let b Bh (q) denote the set of plans (c0,θ 0,θ) satisfying the
budget constraints p0(c0 +κ1{θh6=0})+π0θ0 +π ·θ ≤ p0eh
0 and ˜ eh +θ0 +˜ a·θ ≥ 0.
T h en o - a r b i t r a g es e ti st h eo p e nc o n eQ = {(p0,Λ.a0,...,Λ.aJ); (p0,Λ) ∈ R
S+1
++ }.







hp(q)] and Zhn(q) ≡ [chn
0 (q) − eh
0,θ
hn
0 (q),0] under entry and non-
entry. The excess demand correspondence Zh(q) is deﬁned as Zhd(q) when decision
d ∈ {p,n} is strictly optimal, and as the interval [Zhp(q),Zhn(q)] when the agent
is indiﬀerent between entry and non-entry. Zh(q) is homogeneous of degree 0,
upper hemi-continuous and satisﬁes Walras’ law. Consider a vector q 6=0on the
frontier of Q, and a sequence {qn}∞
n=1 of elements of Q converging to q. Following
Hens (1991), it is easy to show that inf{kzk;z ∈ Zh(qn)} →∞and inf{kzk;z ∈






consumption is non-negative, the set NZh(qn) ≥− eh is also bounded below. We
conclude by standard arguments that an equilibrium exists (Hens, 1991).
6.2. Constrained Eﬃciency of Equilibrium







h∈H), and assume that there exists
a feasible allocation (dh
0, e dh)h∈H such that Uh(dh
0, e dh) >U h(ch
0,˜ ch) for all h.F o r
every agent, there exists (ηh
0,ηh) such that e dh =˜ eh + ηh
0 +˜ a · ηh. Since (dh
0, e dh) is
strictly preferred to (ch
0,˜ ch), it must be that dh
0 + π0ηh





0 + κ1{ηh6=0})dµ(h) >e 0, which contradicts feasibility.
247. Appendix B - One-Factor Economies
7.1. Participation Set (Proof of Properties 1 and 2)





continuous and strictly decreasing on R.I ta l s os a t i s ﬁes limϕp→−∞ GΛ(ϕp)=+ ∞
and limϕp→+∞ GΛ(ϕp)=−∞. The equation GΛ(ϕp)=0has thus a unique solution




f(ϕp + Λ) − f(ϕp − Λ)
f(ϕp + Λ)+f(ϕp − Λ)+µ(PΛ)/Λ
,
which is contained between −1 and 1. We conclude that ϕp(Λ)−Λ and ϕp(Λ)+Λ
are respectively decreasing and increasing in Λ, and thus that PΛ is decreasing.
7.2. Equilibrium Properties (Proof of Theorem 3 and Proposition 3)
Existence and Uniqueness. Appendix A establishes the existence of equilibrium
in an economy with ﬁnite state space and non-negative consumption. We now
prove existence and uniqueness in the one-factor CARA-normal case. Consider
H0(Λ)=µ(PΛ) and H1(Λ)=µ(PΛ)(Va r PΛϕ). The monotonicity of PΛ im-





ϕp+Λ(ϕ−ϕp)2f(ϕ)dϕ has derivative H0
1(Λ)=Λ2H0
0(Λ) < 0. Equi-
librium is determined by (3.5) −(3.6). The function R1 is strictly increasing, and
R2 is decreasing. The diﬀerence function R1(Λ) − R2(Λ) is therefore strictly in-
creasing and maps [0,+∞) onto [−R2(0),+∞). We conclude that there exists a
unique equilibrium.
Impact of Financial Innovation. Using Cramer’s rule, we check that ﬁnancial
innovation increases the interest rate: dR
dα > 0. On the other hand, dΛ
dα has the
same sign as G(α) − 2 ≡ αχγH1[Λ(α)] − 2. Since G(0) = 0, the function Λ(α) is
decreasing on a neighborhood of α =0 . We also oberve that if G(α)=2 , then
G0(α) > 0. The equations G(α)=2and dΛ
dα =0thus have at most one solution
on (0,1].
Impact of Entry Fee. Cramer’s rule implies that dΛ
dκ > 0. A higher entry cost κ
thus reduces the participation set PΛ.
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is deﬁned for any ϕp ∈ RL and
Λ =( Λ1,..,ΛL) ∈ RL
++. We observe




















1P(ϕp,Λ)(ϕ), where 1P(ϕp,Λ) denotes the indi-
cator function of P(ϕp,Λ). Since k(ϕ;ϕp,Λ) is convex in ϕp and µ has an un-
bounded support, the function K(ϕp,Λ)=1
2
R
RL k(ϕ;ϕp,Λ)dµ(ϕ) is strictly con-
vex in ϕp. A vector ϕp thus minimizes K(ϕp,Λ) on RL if and only if ∂K
∂ϕp = R
P(ϕp;Λ)(ϕ − ϕp)dµ(ϕ)=0 .S i n c eK diverges to +∞ as kϕpk → +∞,t h e r ee x i s t s
a unique minimizer ϕp. ¥
For every R>0,l e tΛ(R) denote the vector with components Λ (R)= p





Λ(R),Λ(R)], and the function















We check that z0(R)=χκ(1 + R)
dµ[P(R)]
dR , which is weakly negative by Fact C2
below. We conclude that the equilibrium equation z(R)=l nR has thus a unique
solution.
Fact C2. The mass of participants µ[P(R)] is a decreasing function of R.
Proof.W eﬁrst show that the property holds under complete markets: α  =1for
all  . For any R, the boundary of the participation set P(R) is a sphere, which is
denoted S(R). Given two positive numbers R and δ, δ < R, we seek to show that
µ[P(R)] ≤ µ[P(R−δ)]. T h ei n e q u a l i t yi st r i v i a l l ys a t i s ﬁed when P(R) ⊆ P(R−δ).
When P(R) Ã P(R − δ), the intersection of the spheres S(R) and S(R − δ) is
contained in a hyperplane H. Consider axes such that H is described by the
equation ϕ1 =0 , and the center of gravity ϕp(R)=( x,0...0) has a positive ﬁrst
coordinate x.W ec h e c kt h a tϕp(R − δ) has coordinates (y,0...0), where y<x .
26When the interest rate moves from R to R − δ, agents in P+ = P(R − δ)\P(R)
enter, agents in P− = P(R)\P(R−δ) exit, and agents in PC = P(R)∩P(R−δ)
participate under both interest rates (Figure 8). Since P(R)=P− ∪ PC and




PC ϕ1dµ(ϕ)=xµ [P(R)], and R
P+ ϕ1dµ(ϕ)+
R






ϕ1dµ(ϕ)=yµ [P(R − δ)] − xµ [P(R)].
The left-hand side of the equation is positive because P+ i sc o n t a i n e di nt h e
half-space ϕ1 > 0 and P− i sc o n t a i n e di nt h eh a l f - s p a c eϕ1 < 0. Since x>y ,
we infer that xµ [P(R)] ≤ yµ [P(R − δ)] ≤ xµ [P(R − δ)], and conclude that
µ[P(R)] ≤ µ[P(R − δ)] holds under complete markets.
When markets are incomplete, consider the linear rescaling ϕ∗
  = Φ (ϕ)=
ϕ 
√
α  and the corresponding measure µ∗ = µ◦Φ−1. Note that these transforma-
t i o n sa r ei n d e p e n d e n to fR. For every R>0, the rescaled set P∗(R)=Φ[P(R)]
has a spherical boundary. We conclude that µ[P(R)] = µ∗[P∗(R)] is decreasing
in R. ¥
8.2. Numerical Simulation
This subsection presents the microeconomic framework used in the simulation of





0 > 0 is therefore proportional to expected income.28
The aggregate endowment in period 1 satisﬁes e e = e0(1 + σ1e ε1). Without loss of
generality, mean income is normalized to unity: e0 =1 .
We specify the cross-sectional distribution of income to be lognormal: lneh
0 ∼
N(µz,σ2
z). Since mean income is normalized to 1, µz and σ2
z satisfy the restriction
µz + σ2
z/2=0 .W e c h o o s e µz = −0.25, which corresponds to a reasonable Gini
coeﬃcient of 0.4. The standard deviation of aggregate income growth σ1 is set at
0.04. Since ϕh
1 = σ1eh
0, the loading density f1(ϕ1) is now fully speciﬁed.
The loading density f2(ϕ2) is assumed to be a centered Gaussian N(0,σ2
2)
with standard deviation σ2 =0 .10. T h ed i s c o u n tf a c t o ri sβ =0 .96. Since e0 =1 ,
the coeﬃcients γ and χ−1 coincide with relative risk aversion and intertemporal
elasticity at the mean endowment point. We choose γ =1 0and χ−1 =2 . The
fraction of mean income used in the entry process is set equal to κ =0 .8%.
28We assume for simplicity that there is no expected growth between the two periods.
27The aggregate shock is partially tradable. We choose α1 =0 .5, which is
roughly consistent with the correlation between the NYSE value-weighted return
and the permanent aggregate labor income shock reported in Campbell, Cocco,
Gomes and Maenhout (2001). The stock is a traded asset of the form e a = x+e ε
A
1 .
We select x to obtain a risk premium Ee Ra − R equal to 7% before ﬁnancial
innovation (α2 =0 ) .
8.3. Proof of Proposition 4
We provide an example in an economy with two uncorrelated factors (ε1,ε 2).
Letting δ =0 .01, we consider ϕA =( −2,0),ϕ B =( 1+δ,0),ϕ C =( 2 ,0),ϕ − =
(0,−1+δ) and ϕ+ =( 0 ,1 − δ), with respective weights mA = mB =1 /5,m C =
1/10,m + = m− =1 /4. The other parameters of the economy are γ = χ =0 .7,
κ =0 .3,e 0 = Ee e =1 ,α 2 =0 .9.
A straightforward extension of Theorem 4 implies that a unique equilibrium
exists for any α1. When α1 =0 .55, we check that the participation set contains
all the agents of type A,C,+ and −, and the net interest rate is approximately
7.9%. On the other hand when α1 =0 .9, the participation set contains all the
agents of type A,B,C, and the net interest rate has fallen to 5.7%.
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Figure 1: Geometry of the Entry Condition. An agent with random income
participates in risky asset markets if the distance between the tradable component 




hA γ κ / 2 RFigure 2: Effect on Participation of a Decrease in Λ. Financial innovation, either 
in the form of improved spanning or lower transaction costs, reduces the non-
participation parameter Λ=               . When the cross-sectional distributional of 
risk is skewed to the left, a majority of entrants have low risk exposure. As a result, 









































) /( 2 αγ κRFigure 3: Equilibrium of the One-Factor Economy. The equilibrium E of the 
endogenous participation economy is determined by the intersection of the curves 
R1(Λ) and R2(Λ), which respectively express the entry condition and the 
equilibrium of the bond market. The introduction of  a new asset pushes up both 
curves. In the new equilibrium E’, the interest rate R is higher and the shift in the 





















R2(Λ) -Figure 4: Effect of Financial Innovation on Market Participation.  We consider a 
one-factor economy with a lognormal cross-sectional distribution or risk: ln(ϕ) ~ 
N(0, σ2).  The solid curve corresponds to σ = 0.8, and the dashed curve to σ = 1.  
Τhe other parameters of the economy are: γ = c = 1, κ = 1 and β = 1. When the 
completeness index α increases from 0 to 1, participation monotonically increases in
one economy (σ=0.8), and reaches a maximum for an intermediate value of α in the 
the other (σ=1). Non-monotonicity arises from the larger heterogeneity of individual 
incomes in the second economy.  Financial innovation then induces a sharp reduction 
in the precautionary supply of savings, which leads to a strong increase of the 





























0.4 0.6 0.8 1Figure 5: Comparative Statics in a Two-Factor Economy.  Individual labor income 
is exposed to an aggregate shock  and an idiosyncratic risk     . The aggregate shock is 
partially insurable (α1 = 0.5). The idiosyncratic risk is uncorrelated to existing assets 
when α2 = 0 and is fully insurable when α2 = 1. The other parameters are β = 0.96, γ = 
10, c = 0.5, κ = 0.8%, σ1 = 4% and σ2 = 10%. The solid lines illustrate equilibrium in 
the endogenous participation economy as the coefficient α2 varies from 0 to 1. The 
dashed lines are plotted assuming a fixed  set of traders. For comparison purposes, the 
participation sets in both economies coincide when α2 = 0. The effects of innovation on 
the risk premium is substantially stronger under endogenous entry. 
A. Equity Premium (%) B. Interest Rate (%)


















0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Completeness Index α2
0.25 0.5 0.75 1 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Completeness Index α2










Figure 6: Effect on Participation of an Increase in α2. Initial participants are located outside 
the large ellipse of Panel A. When α2 increases, the boundary shrinks vertically (small ellipse), 
and new entrants move the average loadings from ϕp to ϕp
new. The new participation set is 
delimited by the small ellipse of Panel B. The dotted area contains the new entrants, and the 








entryFigure 7: Differential Effects of Financial Innovation.  The cross-sectional loading 
density is the product: f(ϕ1, ϕ2) = g(ϕ1) g(ϕ2), where g is the density of a log-normal 
variable Z: lnZ~   N(-3.5, 1).  Note that exposures to the aggregate and idiosyncratic
risks are independent in the population. The other parameters of the economy are:  γ = 
10, c = 0.5, β = 0.96 and κ = 0.8%. The initial economy has completeness indexes α1 = 
α2 = 0.2, and contains two fixed assets                            As α2 increases from 0.2 to 
1, both risk premia fall. The effect is stronger for the second asset, which is in the 
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A x a εFigure 8: Geometry of the Participation Sets. When the interest rate falls from R to     
R – δ, the average loading moves from ϕp(R) to ϕp(R-d ). Agents in P+ enter the market, 
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